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First Do No Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanctions 
and Human Rights 
Michael Ewing-Chow* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 One problem that has plagued international law has been the enforcement of human 
rights. There is no global supranational body to hold a state in breach of international 
human rights accountable for its action. Short of using force to initiate a regime change, 
the common options taken by international actors have been to either impose trade 
sanctions or to participate in engagement. Both these options have significant drawbacks.  
¶2 One influential study on sanctions concludes from an analysis of more than a 
hundred cases that economic sanctions have only worked to some extent about a third of 
the time.1 However, even this relatively positive assessment has been disputed on the 
grounds that the authors were overly generous in judging what were successful sanctions 
and in not properly separating the effects of sanctions from the impact of the threat or use 
of military force.2 The study also does not clearly differentiate between sanctions 
imposed to affect relatively modest behavior modifications in a friendly state and those 
imposed to cause regime change in a rogue state. It has been suggested that sanctions are 
usually more effective in the former and less effective in the latter due to conflict 
expectations.3  
¶3 Indeed, most trade sanctions aimed at regime change, as illustrated by the cases of 
Cuba and Iraq, have done little to hurt those who wield power and instead have led to the 
targeted regimes consolidating their positions.4 This is often the case since the targeted 
regimes are able to develop alternative means of circumventing the sanctions whereas 
legitimate private traders cannot do so. While some believe that sufficient hardship to the 
population of a country will result in an internal uprising causing a regime change, 
perhaps inspired by the American War of Independence, this is too simplistic a view that 
does not take into account the likelihood of such an event based on the history, culture 
and power differential of each country. 5 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. The writer would like to thank 
Femke Rethans for her significant contributions to this paper. 
1 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 
93 (Institute for International Economics, 2d ed. 1990). 
2 See Robert A Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work , 22 INT’L SEC. 90, 90,136 (1997). 
3 See DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 307-309 (Cambridge Studies in International Relations ed., Cambridge University Press 1999). 
4 See ERNEST H. PREEG, CENTER FOR STRATEGICE & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FEELING GOOD OR DOING 
GOOD WITH SANCTIONS: UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE US NATIONAL INTEREST  11-87 
(1999). 
5 Id.  See also  HOSSEIN G. A SKARI, ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: EXAMINING THEIR PHILOSOPHY AND 
EFFICACY 1-30 (2003) (for a historical perspective on sanctions from the Peloponnesian War to the 
American Civil War). 
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¶4 Engagement on the other hand, for example, in the notable case of the Reagan 
administration’s engagement of South Africa, has not fared any better. Often used as a 
disingenuous excuse for business to continue to trade with regimes, engagement rarely 
results in any concrete outcomes except to maintain the status quo at best and to enrich 
rogue regimes at worst.6 
¶5 The same dilemma is faced by international actors when considering how to 
respond to the Myanmar situation - whether to sanction or to engage.  The US has 
responded to the situation with sweeping sanctions and the EU with more specific 
sanctions. The regional countries have, however, kept up their policy of diplomacy and 
engagement. It is questionable whether these strategies comply with international 
obligations and perhaps more importantly, if they do any good. 
II. A RECENT HISTORY OF MYANMAR 
¶6 Myanmar was once one of the wealthiest countries in Southeast Asia and was 
believed to be on a fast track to development because of significant natural resources.7 
However, in 1962 General Ne Win overthrew the elected civilian government and 
replaced it with a repressive military government.  The military government isolated 
Myanmar from the international community and formed a centrally planned economy 
under the slogan “the Burmese way to socialism.” Socialism led to the nationalization of 
all major foreign and domestically owned businesses and also of many smaller shops and 
stalls. Production soon declined under government control and towards the end of the 
1960s the country, once Asia’s largest rice exporter, was facing food deficits.8 Despite 
strong economic growth in the Southeast Asian region, Myanmar applied and was 
declared a Least Developed Country by the UN in 1987.9 
¶7 The present ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC)10, now led by General Than Shwe, has been criticized by much of the 
international community since the SPDC used force to respond to the demonstrations in 
1988 and it refused to honor the results of the 1990 elections.11 In those elections, the 
National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi received 62 percent of 
the votes cast, taking some 80 percent of the 485 seats contested.12  
¶8 More recently, in May 2003 following an attack on Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade 
and subsequent crackdown on the NLD, in which a number of people were killed, Aung 
San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest.13  
¶9 Then on October 19, 2004, Myanmar again became the focus of international 
attention with the sudden and unexpected removal of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt.14 The 
                                                 
6 PREEG, supra note 4, at 192-220. 
7 See Robert H. Taylor, Pathways to the Present, in MYANMAR, BEYOND POLITICS TO SOCIETAL 
IMPERATIVES 1, 1-16 (Kyaw Yin Hlaing et al. eds., 2005) (for a history of Myanmar over the last century). 
8 Id. at 17. 
9 Id. at 20. 
10 Previously known as State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). 
11 N. Ganesan, Myanmar’s Foreign Relations, Reaching out to the World, in MYANMAR, BEYOND POLITICS 
TO SOCIETAL IMPERATIVES, 32, 32-33 (Kyaw Yin Hlaing et al. eds., 2005). 
12 HUFBAUER, supra  note 1, at 20. 
13 Taylor, supra  note 7, at 24. 
14 Kate McGeown, Khin Nyut’s Fall From Grace, BBC News, Oct. 19, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3756052.stm (last visited April 15, 2007). 
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Prime Minister had played a leading role in negotiations with ethnic nationality groups as 
well as with Aung San Suu Kyi in the lead up to the National Convention. 15  Khin Nyunt 
has been placed under house arrest allegedly for corruption and replaced by the more 
conservative Lt. Gen. (later General) Soe Win. 16  The regime appears increasingly 
isolationist, as illustrated by its November 7, 2005 announcement of the sudden and 
abrupt relocation of its capital to the remote town of Pyinmana.17 
¶10 Finally, in May 2006, despite UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s appeal to 
General Than Shwe and the military government to release Aung San Suu Kyi, 18 her 
house arrest was extended once again. 19  
¶11 The political problems of Myanmar are reflected in the wider problems faced by its 
people, with both a poor standard of living and poor economic prospects. Healthy life 
expectancy at birth is only 49.9 for males and 53.5 for females20 and, although figures 
vary widely, per capita income for 2005 is estimated to be US$145 at a realistic exchange 
rate.21 
¶12 The military government has been accused of grave violations of basic human 
rights including forced labor, the use of child soldiers, forced relocation, summary 
executions, torture and the rape of women and girls, particularly of members of ethnic 
minorities.22 In addition the junta’s policies and decisions have caused or exacerbated a 
host of ills for the entire Southeast Asian region, from large refugee outflows, to the 
spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases and the trafficking of drugs and human 
beings.23 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Myanmar’s Hardliners Extend Control After Shock PM Sacking , AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 20, 
2004, http://www.burmanet.org/news/2004/10/20/agence-france-presse-myanmars-hardliners-extend-
control-after-shock-p m-sacking/#more-4521 (last visited April 16, 2007). 
17 Aung Lwin Oo Rangoon Moves Ministries to Pyinmana, THE IRRAWADDY, Nov. 7, 2005, 
http://www.burmanet.org/news/2005/11/07/irrawaddy-rangoon-moves-ministries-to-pyinmana-aung-lwin-
oo/. 
18 Press Release, Secretary General, Secretary-General appeals to Myanmar’s government to release Aung 
San Suu Kyi, U.N. Doc. SC/SM 10477, (May 26 2006), 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10477.doc.htm. 
19 Burma Extends Suu Kyi’s Detention, BBC News, May 27 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5022626.stm. 
20 World Health Organization, Health Report on Myanmar, (2002), available at 
http://www.who.int/countries/mmr/en/  (see statistics chart in center of the webpage for life expectancy 
rates). 
21 David I Steinberg, Myanmar, The roots of the Economic Malaise, in MYANMAR, BEYOND POLITICS TO 
SOCIETAL IMPERATIVES, 93 (Kyaw Yin Hlaing et al. eds., 2005). 
22 Human Rights in Burma: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going: Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations and the Subcomm. on Asia and 
the Pacific of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Tom 
Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Dir., Human Rights Watch) [hereinafter Malinowski statement], 
available at  http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/02/10/usint12658_txt.ht m; Human Rights in Burma: Where 
Are We Now and Where Are We Going : Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human 
Rights and International Operations and the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the H. Comm. on 
International Relations, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Barry F. Lowenkron, Ass. Sec. for Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor, Secretary of State) [hereinafter Lownkron statement] available at, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2006/60801.htm; Amnesty Int’l, AI Report 2006, Myanmar Overview 
(2006), http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/mmr-summary-eng. 
23  Lownkron statement, supra note 22. 
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III. THE RESPONSES 
¶13 Soon after the military government responded to demonstrations with force in 
1988, President George H.W. Bush revoked Myanmar’s benefits under the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP)24 ostensibly because of Myanmar’s violations of 
internationally recognized workers’ rights.25 In 1990, the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 
was passed by the US Senate and Congress, requiring the US President to impose 
economic sanctions against Myanmar or as the US prefers to call it, Burma,26 “if specific 
conditions were not met, including progress on human rights and suppression of the 
outflow of narcotics”.27 Subsequently, on July 22, 1991, President Bush invoked the 
Customs and Trade Act and refused to renew the bilateral textile agreement with 
Myanmar that had expired on December 31, 1990.28  
¶14 On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed the 1997 Foreign Operations 
Act,29 which prohibits the US from giving any new assistance to Myanmar.30 The Act 
gave the US President the discretion to prohibit individuals in the United States from 
initiating “new investments” in Myanmar.31 This was followed soon after by President 
Clinton’s signing of an executive order implementing the provisions in the Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Bill on May 20, 1997, which prohibited new investment by 
US persons in Myanmar and barred any modification or expansion of existing trade 
commitments.32 
¶15 On March 31, 2003, the US State Department released its report “Burma: Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002” which accused the ruling SPDC of very 
                                                 
24 United States Council for International Business: Policy Advocacy, ( “USCIB”), THE FORCED LABOR 
SITUATION IN BURMA: BRIEF HISTORY AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS [hereinafter THE FORCED LABOR 
SITUATION], http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=1923 (last visited September 22 2006). 
25 PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, US/EU/Japan v. Burma – Case 88-1 in CASE 
STUDIES IN SANCTIONS AND TERRORISM (1988) 
http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/myanmar.htm. 
26 In 1989, the military government officially changed the English version of the country’s name from 
Burma to Myanmar, along with changes to the English versions of many place names in the country, such 
as its former capital city from Rangoon to Yangon. The official name of the country in the Burmese 
language, Myanmar, did not change. The renaming proved to be politically controversial. As the military 
government was not legitimately elected, some governments  such as the US have contended that it did not 
have the authority to officially change the name in English and have continued to use the name Burma 
instead. The EU uses the term Burma/Myanmar. For the purposes of this paper, the official name Myanmar 
will be used solely as a convenience without any political connotations. 
27 http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=1924 (last visited September 22 2006) (t imeline of ILO 
and U.S. actions regarding Burma). 
28 THE FORCED LABOR SITUATION, supra note 24. 
29Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriation Act 1997, § 570, 110 Stat. 
3009-166 to 3009-167, (codified at Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-
121 to 3009-172 (1997)) [hereinafter Cohen Feinstein Amendment]. 
30 Id. § 570.  (relief and anti-drug aid is excluded. In addition, the Act requires federal representatives of 
international financial institutions to vote against any proposed financial assistance to Burma, and limits the 
issuance of visas to Burmese officials). 
31 “The Act defines ‘new investment’ as entry into a contract that would favor the ‘economical 
development of resources in Burma,’ or would provide ownership interests in or benefits from such 
development… but the term specifically excludes . . . ‘entry into, performance of, or financing of a contract 
to sell or purchase goods, services or technology.’” Adrienne S, Khorasanee, Sacrificing Burma to Save 
Free Trade: the Burma Freedom Act and the World Trade Organization, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1295 
(2002). 
32 Foreign Appropriations Act, supra note 29. 
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serious human rights abuses including rape, torture and murder.33 Two months later, on 
May 31, the SPDC placed the pro-democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi in “protective 
custody.”  
¶16 The US response to the report and the imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi was the 
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA).34  The BFDA was passed by the 
US House of Representatives on July 15 2003 by a vote of 418-2 and by the US Senate 
on 16 July 2003 by a vote of 94-1.35  
¶17 President George W. Bush signed the BFDA and issued an Executive Order 
implementing the legislation on July 29, 2003. The BFDA contains a clause allowing the 
US President to waive the application of any provision deemed contrary to “national 
security interests.”36 To date, no waivers have been made. 
¶18 The BFDA bans the importation of any goods produced, manufactured, grown or 
assembled in Myanmar,37 requires the US treasury to direct US financial institutions to 
freeze assets in the United States of “those individuals who hold senior positions in the 
SPDC,”38 and expands a ban on visas to the US for officials of the SPDC.39 The BFDA 
states that the US will also block any application by Myanmar for soft loans from the 
IMF and the World Bank.40  
¶19 The BFDA provides that the ban will remain in effect until the US President 
determines and certifies to Congress that the Myanmar military government has made 
“substantial and measurable progress to end violations of internationally recognized 
human rights including rape.”41 To have the ban lifted, the BFDA requires that the US 
Secretary of State consult with the Secretary General of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and other relevant nongovernmental organizations and report to the 
appropriate congressional committees that the SPDC “no longer systematically violates 
workers’ rights, including the use of forced and child labor, and conscription of child-
soldiers.”42 
¶20 The US President must also declare that the SPDC has made “measurable and 
substantial progress toward implementing a democratic government”, and before the US 
                                                 
33 See US STATE DEPARTMENT , BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR, BURMA: COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2002), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18237.htm (last 
visited September 22 2006). 
34 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 [hereinafter Burmese Freedom Act], Pub. L. No. 108-61, 
§§ 1-9, 117 Stat. 864 (2003) (codified as 50 USC §  1701 (2000)). 
35 See USINFO.STATE.GOV, Bush applauds Congress for passing Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, 
July 16, 2003, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2003/Jul/16-496555.html (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2006).  (a previous bill for a Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 1995 did not reach this stage). 
36 Burmese Freedom Act, supra note 34, § 3(b).  The President may waive the provisions descried in this 
section for any or all articles that are a product of Burma if the President determines and notifies the 
Committees on Appropriations, Finance, and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on 
Appropriations, International Relations and Ways and Means of the House of Representatives that to do so 
is in the national interest of the United States. Burmese Freedom Act, supra note 34, § 3(b). 
37 Burmese Freedom Act, supra note 34, § 3(a)(1) . (in particular, § 3(a)(2) contains restrictions on 
Burmese imports originating from parties connected to the SPDC, known Burmese narcotics traffickers, the 
Union of Myanmar Economics Holdings  Incorporated (UMEHI), the Myanmar Economic Cooperation 
(MEC) and the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA)). 
38 Id. § 4. 
39 Id. § 6(a)(1). 
40 See Burmese Freedom Act, supra note 34, § 5. 
41 Id. § 3(a)(3)(A). 
42 Id. § 3(a)(3)(B). 
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President will do so, the SPDC is required to release all political prisoners, and allow 
freedoms of speech and press freedom, and freedom of association and religion. 43 In 
addition, the SPDC would have to reach an agreement with the NLD and other 
democratic forces in that country, including Burma's ethnic nationalities, “on the transfer 
of power to a civilian government accountable to the Burmese people through democratic 
elections under the rule of law.”44  
¶21 The BFDA was set to expire on July 28, 2006. However, on August 1, 2006, 
President George W. Bush extended the BFDA for another 3 years.45 The Presidential 
Press Release on the BFDA in 2003 explains that: 
[a]mong other measures, the legislation bans the import of Burmese 
products. The executive order freezes the assets of senior Burmese 
officials and bans virtually all remittances to Burma. By denying these 
rulers the hard currency they use to fund their repression, we are providing 
strong incentives for democratic change and human rights in Burma. 46  
¶22 It should be noted that in the debate on the bill, US senators stressed the need for a 
multilateral approach to sanctions on Myanmar but were content to approve the 
immediate unilateral sanctions found in the BFDA. 47 
¶23 Unfortunately, during the last three years in which the unilateral trade sanctions by 
the US have been in place, the military government has entrenched itself even more, 
moved its capital from Rangoon to Pyinmana and continued with its lucrative (and 
partially black market) cross-border trade in timber, natural gas and gems. Meanwhile, 
the people in Myanmar have grown steadily poorer due to the sanctions. The US State 
Department estimates a loss of 60,000 jobs in the textile sector alone.48 The US State 
Department reports also suggest that per capita incomes in Myanmar fell from US$300 to 
US$225 from 2003 to 2004,49 a fall largely attributable to the BFDA. Unofficial estimates 
of the per capita income in 2005 suggest an even greater fall to US$145 at a realistic 
exchange rate.50 
¶24 As Jeffrey Sachs points out: 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Press Release, White House, President Renews Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Aug. 1, 
2006, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060801.html; see Burmese 
Freedom Act § 9(b)(3) (the Act itself sets a 3 year limit after which it should be reconsidered for an 
additional 3 year extension). 
46 Press Release, White House, Statement on Burmese Democracy Act, July 28, 2003, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030728-8. 
47 See US Senate Debate on Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, 144 CONG. REC. S7690-702 (daily ed. 
June 11, 2003) (particularly prudent are the statements of Senators Grassley and Baucus). 
48 US DEPT . OF STATE, REPORT ON US TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA, (2004), available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/32106.htm. 
49 US DEPT . OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, BURMA: COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2004 (2005), available at  
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41637.htm; US DEPT . OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, BURMA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2003, (2004), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27765.htm. 
50 See Steinberg, supra  note 21. 
Vol. 5:2] Michael Ewing-Chow 
 159 
[The sanctions] have systematically weakened the [Myanmar] economy by 
limiting trade, investment and foreign aid. Yet weakening a country's 
economy does not necessarily weaken a regime relative to its political 
opposition. Often, the impasse is merely deepened. Civil society and the 
political opposition suffer from brain drain, a squeeze on financial 
resources and reduced contacts with the outside world, while the regime is 
able to blame foreign meddling for policy mistakes. Hardliners on both 
sides, meanwhile, gain the upper hand over moderates, blocking changes 
that might otherwise be encouraged.51 
¶25 While the strongest, if not the most measured, response to the actions of the 
Myanmar regime came from the US in the form of the BFDA sanctions, the European 
Union (EU) has also adopted a Common Position52 on Myanmar since October 1996. 
Apart from confirming existing sanctions such as an arms embargo 53 and the suspension 
of all defense cooperation and all non-humanitarian bilateral aid, the EU “introduced a 
visa ban on the members of the military regime, the members of the government, senior 
military and security officers and members of their families, as well as the suspension of 
high- level governmental visits to Burma/Myanmar.”54  
¶26 During 1997, the EU also revoked Burma’s benefits under the Generalized System 
of Preferences, affecting US $30 million, or 5 percent, of Burmese exports.55 On May 22, 
2000, the EU imposed a freeze on assets held abroad by persons related to Burmese 
governmental functions, and banned the export of “equipment that might be used for 
internal repression or terrorism” to Burma.56 Since then, EC Council Regulation 
1081/2000 has since been amended several times to expand the list of people whose 
financial assets have been frozen in the EU.57 
¶27 The EU decided to suspend the implementation of further sanctions until October 
29, 2003, pending substantial progress on key issues such as the start of a substantive 
dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, the release of political prisoners and a 
reduction of violence and human rights violations.58 However, after the events of May 31, 
2003 and the placement of Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, the EU decided on June 
16, 2003 to impose the new expanded sanctions, to target more persons linked to the 
economic or political activities of the SPDC by extending the visa ban and asset freeze, 
and by amending and strengthening the arms embargo.59 
¶28 The first multilateral response to the situation in Myanmar came in 1999 when the 
ILO passed a resolution highlighting the failure of the Myanmar regime’s continued 
widespread use of forced labor for work on infrastructure projects and as porters for the 
                                                 
51 Jeffrey Sachs, Myanmar: Sanctions Won’t Work, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, July 27 2004. 
52 EC Common Position 96/635/CSFP (European Union Common Position Paper). 
53 The arms embargo was imposed in 1990.  See Council Statement Concerning Burma , THE HAGUE, July 
29, 1991. 
54  http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/myanmar/intro/ (website provides an overview of the EU’s 
Relations with Burma/ Myanmar) [hereinafter EU’s Relations]. 
55 European Parliament Resolution on the Arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma , Eur. Parl. Doc. P5-TA 
Prov. 0272 (2003),  http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/EUParliament2003-06-05.pdf. 
56 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1081/2000 (European Union Council regulation document). 
57 See EU’s Relations, supra  note 54. 
58 Id. 
59 Council Decision 2003/461/CFSP (European Union Concil decision document). 
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army. 60 The 1999 ILO resolution provided for the cessation of technical cooperation with 
Myanmar and barring Myanmar from all meetings except those aimed at resolving the 
problem of Myanmar’s lack of compliance with the ILO conventions it had ratified.61 
Then in 2000, when Myanmar’s regime completely failed to respond to the ILO’s 
recommendations on the prevention of forced labor, the ILO for the first time in its 
history invoked Article 33 of its Constitution recommending that ILO members review 
their relations with Myanmar and take appropriate measures to ensure that Myanmar did 
not breach its obligations against forced labor.62 Apart from this measure which resulted 
in some reputation cost to the Myanmar government, no further concrete measures were 
adopted and the ILO continues to report that forced and compulsory labor remains 
prevalent in many areas of the country in circumstances of severe cruelty and brutality, 
particularly in the border areas inhabited by ethnic minorities in which there is a strong 
military presence.63  
¶29 The regional governments have been even more cautious in their approach. 
ASEAN, as a consensus building, non- interfering organization, has not reached a 
common position regarding Myanmar, despite the widespread feeling of its member 
countries that the group cannot continue to shield a country which has made little 
progress in catching up with the region, either politically or economically.64  The only 
outcome of a host of diplomatic measures by ASEAN nations was that Myanmar was 
persuaded to forego the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN which it was supposed to have 
taken up in 2006.65  
¶30 Meanwhile, Myanmar’s two giant neighbors, India and China, continue to jockey 
for influence over a state they both see as strategically important for them. Myanmar has 
become one of China's closest allies in Southeast Asia, a major recipient of Chinese 
military hardware and a potential springboard for projecting Chinese military power in 
the region. 66 This alliance has alarmed India, which in recent years has shifted its strategy 
away from supporting Myanmar's opposition movement towards cementing ties with the 
government and has offered Myanmar favorable trade relations and cooperation against 
ethnic insurgents along the Indo-Myanmar frontier.67 Both countries have expressed 
concerns about the situation in Myanmar, yet are reluctant to interfere in the domestic 
affairs of a strategic ally.  This has led to ASEAN’s Secretary-General on March 31, 
                                                 
60 ILO, Resolution on the widespread use of forced labor in Myanmar, 87th Session, Geneva 1999, 
available at  http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/com-myan.htm. 
61 Id. 
62 Press Release, ILO, International Labour Conference adopts Resolution targeting forced labour in 
Myanmar (Burma), (June 14, 2000), available at  
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2000/27.htm. 
63 International Labor Conference, 93rd session, 2005, Report of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III (1A), 177-78 (2005), available at 
http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc93/pdf/rep-iii-1a.pdf. 
64 John McBeth, Interview with ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong: Moving away from the family 
way, THE STRAITS TIMES, February 24, 2006.  
65 Myanmar Gives up 2006 ASEAN Chairmanship, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, July 26, 2005, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/07/26/asia/web.0726asean.php. 
66 Ganesan, supra  note 11, at 38.  
67 INDIAN INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, China’s Ambitions in Myanmar India Steps Up 
Countermoves, 6 IISS STRATEGIC COMMENTS 6 July 2000. 
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2006 to call upon them to use their considerable influence on the Myanmar regime.68 To 
date, neither China nor India have done so. 
¶31 It is therefore important to determine which approach should be preferred among 
the alternatives offered.  These alternatives include the US sanctions in the form of the 
BFDA, the more measured EU sanctions or the engagement favored by the regional 
countries. 
IV.  TRADE SANCTIONS AND THE WTO 
¶32 The sweeping nature of BFDA imposed sanctions constitutes a prima facie 
violation of US obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) because both the 
US and Myanmar are original members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).69 The sanctions imposed by the EU being more measured and targeted only at 
financial assets held abroad by the SPDC and at the export of arms and “equipment that 
might be used for internal repression or terrorism” to Myanmar would, as discussed 
below, appear to be less likely a violation of its WTO obligations.70 
¶33 It should be recalled that the selective purchasing law of Massachusetts, the so-
called Massachusetts Burma Law, was challenged under the WTO by the EU for 
nullification and Japan as a third party71 for violating the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA).72 The EU argued that Massachusetts’ procurement policy had to 
conform to the WTO rules and that the Burma Law contravened the WTO procurement 
agreement by imposing conditions that were not essential to fulfill the contract (GPA 
Article VIII(b)), imposing qualifications based on political instead of economic 
considerations (GPA Article X), and allowing contracts to be awarded based on political 
instead of economic considerations (GPA Article XIII).73 However, before a WTO panel 
could examine the dispute, the panel proceedings were suspended, because the 
Massachusetts Burma Law was held to be unconstitutiona l in a decision later upheld by 
the US Supreme Court.74 Neither the EU nor Japan has challenged the BFDA despite it 
being even broader than the Massachusetts Burma Law and even more likely a breach of 
the GPA by discriminating against all goods of Myanmar origin. The reason for their 
                                                 
68 ASEAN Urges China, India to Persuade Burma to Move toward Democracy, INDIA DAILY, March 31, 
2006, http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/7722.asp. 
69 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 UNTS 194 as amended and 
incorporated into Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 ILM 1125 (1994). 
70 Council Regulation (EC) No1081/2000 of May 22 2000, 2000 O.J. (L. 122). 
71 Note by the Secretariat, United States – Measure Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS88 / 
WT/DS95, (Feb. 14, 2000).  See Christopher McCrudden, International Economic Law and the Pursuit of 
Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of ‘Selective Purchasing’ Laws under the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 3-48 (1999), (for a more complete analysis of 
the issue regarding selective purchasing). 
72 Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 4B, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1915 UNTS 103 
(1994). 
73 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States – Measure Affecting Government 
Procurement, WT/DS/1, GPA/DS2/1 (June 26, 1997). 
74 Crosby v Nat’l Foreign Trade Council , 530 U.S. 363, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (2000). (the suit was brought by the 
National Foreign Trade Council, an association of U.S. companies doing business abroad, with whom the 
EU joined as an amicus). 
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reticence is not entirely clear although it may well be that neither of them want to appear 
to be supportive of the present military government. 
¶34 Nonetheless, apart from the fact that the BFDA is likely to be in breach of the GPA 
and GATT Article XI prohibiting quantitative trade restrictions, the BFDA’s 
discrimination against all goods of Myanmar origin is also clearly a breach of GATT 
Article I - the fundamental Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle. This MFN principle of 
non-discrimination requires that import and export measures not discriminate between 
like products75 from other countries. A unilateral trade ban targeted at Myanmar will be a 
prima facie violation of this principle; it discriminates based on the country of origin of 
the goods.  
A. Process and Production Method 
¶35 While it might be argued that the discrimination is nevertheless based on origin-
neutral criteria on the process and production method (PPM) of goods from Myanmar - 
namely that the goods are manufactured in a manner which violates labor or human 
rights, this traditional PPM argument has not been a persuasive one since the 
Tuna/Dolphin cases.76 While neither Tuna/Dolphin cases dealt specifically with labor or 
human rights issues, the legal principles still are applicable to the present case.  
¶36 In those cases, the PPM involved catching tuna by fishing without dolphin friendly 
precautions. When the US banned the imports of such dolphin unfriendly tuna, the GATT 
dispute settlement panels in both cases declared that this was a breach of GATT norms 
not to discriminate between like products based on how the products had been 
produced.77 Environmentalists and other policy makers may find this objectionable 
because they want to impose sanctions for environmental protection reasons.   However, 
permitting trade restrictions on the basis of policy concerns could allow protectionist 
policies to masquerade as environmental concerns.  
¶37 This would also be the case for labor rights protection. It would be easy to argue 
that a labor right had been breached in order to legitimize a measure aimed more at 
protection of domestic jobs than addressing the violation of labor rights. Further in the 
case of the BFDA, it seems implausible that all products from Myanmar are produced in 
breach of labor or human rights.  
B. GATT Exceptions 
¶38 Although the BFDA is prima facie in breach of the GATT, a breach of a GATT 
obligation may be justified by one of the General Exceptions of Article XX or the 
Security Exception of Article XXI of the GATT. 
                                                 
75 The WTO Appellate Body has set out general principles regarding ‘like products’ in Appellate Body 
Report.  See Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, (Oct.4, 1996). (it is not within the scope 
of this article to go into the details  of the principles). 
76 First Submission of the United States to the Panel, United States-Restrictions on the Imports of Tuna, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 155 (1993) (unadopted) (hereinafter Tuna Dolphin I); Report of the Panel, 
United States – Restrictions on the Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June 16, 1994)(unadopted) (hereinafter Tuna 
Dolphin II). 
77 Id. 
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1. The Specific Exceptions 
¶39 The WTO Appellate Body has allowed PPMs to be implemented, albeit in a limited 
way, by way of the exceptions found in Article XX of the GATT. A two stage test is 
required. First, it has to be determined which specific exception of Article XX is 
applicable and second whether the requirements of the chapeau to Article XX is satisfied. 
The Appellate Body applied this two stage sequence of analysis in the Shrimp/Turtle78 
case. The first stage is more substantive and deals with whether the specific exception 
applies to exempt the PPM and the second stage is more procedural, whereby the manner 
in which the PPM is implemented is examined.79 There is also some debate in the 
Tuna/Dolphin cases as to the extraterritorial application of Article XX.   However, 
Shrimp/Turtle appears to have impliedly accepted that some extraterritorial measures can 
fall within the Article XX exceptions since both the Panel and the Appellate Body 
accepted that the measures to protect sea turtles which were outside of US territorial 
waters and could be covered by Article XX but for the failure of the US measure to pass 
the chapeau requirement. 
¶40 Article XX does not provide an explicit labor rights or human rights exception. 
However, labor rights and human rights could be covered if the measures are necessary to 
protect public morals (paragraph a), necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health (paragraph b) and/or relating to the products of prison labor (paragraph e). 
¶41 It should be noted that while forming the stillborn International Trade Organization 
(ITO) specific reference to “fair labor standards”80 was made in the ITO Havana Charter. 
However this Charter never came into force due to opposition from the US Congress for 
a variety of reasons.81 The failure to implement the labor rights provisions in the Havana 
Charter and the fact that Article XX(e) only contains prison labor exceptions could 
suggest that if Article XX had been designed to encompass sanctions with respect to 
labor rights, more explicit language would have been used to articulate such an 
exception. 82 Could the exceptions, nevertheless, be extended to include labor rights? 
¶42 Unfortunately, there is no GATT or WTO jurisprudence on the interpretation of the 
prison labor exception and until the recent Offshore Gambling case,83 no guidance with 
regard to the public morals exception. The Offshore Gambling case was brought by 
Antigua and Barbuda against the US federal and state laws which were tantamount to a 
ban on the cross-border provision of internet gambling services. As this was a services 
                                                 
78 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (AB-
1998-4), WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Report of the Appellate Body on Import 
Prohibition]. 
79 Id. 
80 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment: Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Chapter II, art. 7 (Mar. 
24, 1948).  
81 WTO Secretariat, Understanding the WTO – The GATT years from Havana to Marrakesh , available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm. 
82 Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 
261, 289-90 (2005). 
83 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Nov. 14, 2003) (adopted Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Appellate 
Body Report on Supply of Ga mbling]; Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (adopted Nov. 10 2004) [hereinafter Panel Report 
on Supply of Betting Services]. 
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case rather than a goods dispute, the US, invoked Article XIV(a) of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),84 which like GATT Article XX(a), authorizes 
members, subject to certain conditions, to maintain restrictive trade measures necessary 
to protect public morals. Consistent with the previous GATT Article XX cases, the 
Appellate Body in the Offshore Gambling case found that while the US laws could be 
“necessary to protect public morals,” the manner in which the laws discriminated against 
foreign service suppliers by allowing domestic service suppliers to supply remote betting 
services for horse racing was contrary to the chapeau to GATS Article XIV. 85 The 
chapeau to GATS Article XIV is similar to the chapeau to GATT Article XX. 
¶43 The Offshore Gambling case suggests that the public morals exception in GATT 
Article XX could be used to justify a trade restrictive measure but the case still does not 
clearly define what public morals means. The Panel in the case found that “the term 
‘public morals’ denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf 
of a community or nation.”86 It is undeniably difficult for any Panel or Appellate Body to 
circumscribe acceptable public morals but perhaps some guidance for the present 
discussion can be gleaned from the case. The Appellate Body accepted the notion that 
gambling was against the public morals of the US, despite evidence that domestic 
gambling was allowed and thus impliedly that no national consensus on the immorality of 
gambling existed.  This suggests that so long as evidence that some (not all) public 
morality is offended, the exception could apply. If the public morality against gambling is 
so accepted, then measures taken to protect against universal human rights vio lations 
must be even more likely to be so accepted.87 
¶44 Indeed, Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse have argued that the interpretation 
of the public morals exception found in Article XX(a) of GATT should not be frozen in 
time as human rights have evolved into a core element in public morality in many post-
war societies and at the international level, public morals should be extended to universal 
human rights, including labors rights.88 If so, the BFDA could then arguably come under 
the specific exception of Article XX(a) – the protection of the public morality outraged at 
human rights violations in the targeted state.  
¶45 It remains to be seen if this argument will be accepted by WTO Panels or the 
Appellate Body. The concern that this new type of PPM argument could be used as a 
cover for protectionism would be just as true with respect to exceptions based on 
conceptions of public morality even when such conceptions are constrained by a 
requirement restricting public morals to universal human rights. However, unlike in the 
case of the traditional PPM argument, the requirement of necessity in the phrase 
“necessary to protect public morals” and the two stage test incorporating the chapeau 
                                                 
84 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M 1167 (1994). 
85 See Appellate Body Report on Supply of Gambling, supra  note 83, ¶ 371. 
86 See Panel Report on Betting Services, supra  note 83, ¶ 6.465. 
87 See Jeremy C. Marwell, Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals Exception After Gambling, 81 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 802 (2006) (for a discussion of the ambit of the public morals exception); see also  Steve 
Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA . J. INT’L. L. 689 (1997); see also Christoph T. 
Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International Economic Relations: The Public Morals of 
GATT’s Article XX(a) and “Conventional” Rules of Interpretation , 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75 (1998). 
88 Trebilock and House, supra  note 82, at 290. 
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creates two additional gates against concerns of protectionism creeping in by the back 
door. Both these gates will be explored below.  
¶46 The human, animal or plant life or health exception found in Article XX(b) of the 
GATT could also be used to justify public health measures. This exception was for 
example used as a defense in the EC Asbestos89 case to justify an import ban of asbestos 
containing substances to protect public health. Since Shrimp/Turtle impliedly accepts that 
Article XX can apply to extraterritorial protection, this exception could then cover 
measures against products produced in extremely dangerous working conditions,90 or, 
when using a more expansive approach like the one suggested, just as suggested for the 
public morals exception, measures against products made by forced or child labor, 
because practices violating these rights could involve threats to workers’ lives or health. 91 
This exception cannot cover a sanction regime as broad as the BFDA's ban on all 
products, regardless of how they are manufactured, because the health exception only 
offers a partial excuse for trade measures affecting labor and human rights. 
¶47 It should be noted that both the public morals and the human, animal or plant life or 
health exceptions contain a necessity test as part of the text of Article XX. The Appellate 
Body interpreted “necessary” in the EC-Asbestos case as requiring the contracting party 
to use, among the measures “reasonably available”, the measure which entails the least 
degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.92 This has been followed in the 
Offshore Gambling case where the Appellate Body decided that if the complaining party 
raises a WTO-consistent alternative measure that, in its view, the responding party should 
have taken, the responding party will be required to demonstrate why its challenged 
measure nevertheless remains “necessary” in the light of that alternative.93 Although this 
interpretation is less restrictive than in previous cases it is still questionable whether a 
unilateral import restriction entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT 
provisions to achieve the goal of promoting human rights in Myanmar. It will be hard for 
the BFDA to satisfy the necessity condition because only the availability and not the 
effectiveness or feasibility of the measures at issue counts, and there are many other 
policy options the US could have implemented.  
¶48 Apart from finding a specific exception that applies, the even bigger hurdle the 
BFDA would have to clear is satisfying the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. 
The text of the chapeau states that a measure must not be applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade. The Appellate Body noted in United States- Gasoline94 
that the purpose and object of the chapeau generally is to prevent the abuse of the 
exceptions. 
                                                 
89 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products  (AB- 2000 11), WT/DS135/AB/R (Feb. 16, 2001) (adopted March 12 2001) [hereinafter 
Appellate Body Report on Asbestos]. 
90 Budrun Monika Zagel, WTO & Human rights: Examining Linkages and Suggesting Convergence, in 2 
IDLO VOICES OF DEVELOPMENT JURISTS PAPER SERIES Vol 2 No. 2, 13 2005 ). 
91 Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 131 (1999).  
92 Appellate Body Report on Asbestos, supra  note 89, ¶¶ 171-172. 
93 See Appellate Body Report on Supply of Gambling, supra  note 83, ¶¶ 306-11. 
94 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (AB-
1996-1), WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 22, 1996) (adopted Apr. 29 1996). 
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¶49 In the Shrimp/Turtle case the Appellate Body made clear that the chapeau acts as a 
balancing principle to mediate between the right of a member to invoke a Article XX 
exception and its obligation to respect the rights of other members and is thus a 
qualification making the exemptions “limited and conditional”, an expression of the 
principle of good faith in international law and a safeguard against abuses.95 To allow a 
member to misuse or abuse its right to invoke an exception would be effectively to allow 
that member to degrade its own treaty obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of 
other members. The chapeau therefore acts as an important check against protectionist or 
other abusive implementation of trade bans under the guise of labor rights and human 
rights concerns.96 
¶50  One of three requirements must be satisfied under the text of the chapeau in order 
for Article XX to be inapplicable: whether the measure is “a means of unjustifiable 
discrimination” or “a means of arbitrary discrimination,” and if not, whether the measure 
is “a disguised restriction on international trade.” In Shrimp/Turtle, the Appellate Body, 
after finding that the measure at issue was a means of unjustifiable and arbitrary 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, decided that it was 
not necessary to examine also whether the measure was applied in a manner that 
constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade.97   
¶51 It is unlikely that the BFDA would be held to be a measure that arbitrarily 
discriminates between members as the term “arbitrarily discriminates” has been 
interpreted to require that the standard applied be a fair standard. The Appellate Body, 
found in Shrimp/Turtle that the measure at issue did not meet the requirements of the 
chapeau of Article XX relating to arbitrary discrimination because it imposed “a single, 
rigid and unbending requirement” to adopt “essentially the same” policies and 
enforcement practices as those applied to, and enforced on, domestic shrimp trawlers in 
the US and that there were no good reasons for other equivalent standards not to be 
recognized.98 In the BFDA’s case, the standards being applied are unlikely to be held to 
be too arbitrary as they relate to universal human rights and fundamental labor rights. 
¶52 It is unlikely that the BFDA would be seen as a “disguised restriction on 
international trade” or as an ulterior motive of protectionism because the measure is so 
clearly aimed against labor and human rights abuses. Exports from Myanmar to the US 
were mainly textile and teak wood products and only amounted to US$275.7 million in 
2003 before the sanctions.99 The fact that the US does not compete with Myanmar in 
either textile or teak wood production argues strongly against the measure being a 
disguised restriction. 
¶53 More difficult is whether the BFDA is a means of unjustifiable discrimination 
under the chapeau. As part of the process of determining whether the measure had been 
applied in a manner that constituted a means of “unjustifiable discrimination,” the 
                                                 
95 MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL.,THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 455 
(2003). 
96 Trebilcock and Howse, supra  note 82, at 290. 
97 Report of the Appellate Body on Import Prohibition, supra  note 78, ¶ 121. 
98 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
Recourse to Article 21.5 DSU by Malaysia, (AB-2001-4), WT/DS58/AB/RW, ¶  140 (adopted on 
November 21 2001)[hereinafter Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Products]. 
99 US Census Report on Trade, available http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/product/enduse/exports/c5460.html. 
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Appellate Body in the US – Shrimp (Article 21.5) case suggested that “serious, across-
the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral 
agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles” should have been 
conducted before the unilateral sanctions were initiated.100  The Appellate Body 
concluded that because the US negotiated seriously with some Members, but not with 
other Members, including the appellees, the measure was discriminatory and 
unjustifiable.101 The US had an obligation to make serious good faith efforts to reach an 
agreement before resorting to unilateral measures.102 
¶54 If so, then the fact that the US did not negotiate with Myanmar nor other members 
of the WTO before imposing its trade sanctions on all Myanmar products, would suggest, 
following the Shrimp/Turtle requirement of good faith negotiations, that the measure 
could be a means of unjustifiable discrimination. This argument may be strengthened by 
the fact that while the abuses of human and labor rights in Myanmar are severe, they are 
by no means the only violations of human and labor rights occurring in the world today. 
For the measure to fulfil the chapeau requirement against unjustifiable discrimination, 
serious negotiations should be conducted with all countries with similar labor rights and 
human rights compliance problems and the sanctions should be applied to all of them 
below the compliance standards set by the US.103 
2. The Security Exception 
¶55 The security exception of GATT Article XXI provides a more likely exception for 
trade sanctions. Article XXI(b)(iii) states that nothing in the GATT shall be construed to 
prevent any contracting party from taking action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations. Article XXI(c) states that nothing in the GATT shall be construed 
to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations 
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.  
¶56 Article XXI(b)(iii) potentially authorizes trade sanctions taken by a member 
“necessary for the protection of its essential security interest” taken in “time of war” or 
“other emergency in international relations.” While war is a term of art under customary 
international law, the phrase ‘emergency in international relations’ is not. Again, there is 
scant GATT or WTO jurisprudence in this area. In the Nicaragua Sugar case104 and the 
related Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua case,105 both dealing with US trade sanctions 
against Nicaragua in response to the Nicaraguan government’s support of subversive 
activities in the region, the US refused to invoke Article XXI(b)(iii) as the US maintained 
that its dispute with Nicaragua was not subject to GATT disciplines.  
¶57 From the plain meaning of the phrase, “emergency in international relations” 
requires a certain degree of seriousness and would thus apply to international situations 
                                                 
100 Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Products, supra note 98, ¶  17. 
101 Id. ¶  121. 
102 Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Recourse to 
Article 21.5 DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/RW, at para 5.67 (adopted June 15, 2001). 
103 Zagel, supra  note 90, at 14. 
104 United States – Import of Sugar from Nicaragua, March 13, 1984, GATT BISD (31st Supp) (unadopted) 
(Mar. 13, 1984). 
105 Report of the Panel, United States – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, L/6053 (13 October 
1986)(unadopted). 
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that could pose a threat of future armed conflict. However, “emergency in international 
relations” could also refer to an economic, social or political situation. 106 The US could 
perhaps argue that the situation in Myanmar is serious enough due to the gross human 
rights violations and the flow of illegal narcotics from Myanmar, to justify the BFDA. 
The US would have to argue that the measures are “necessary” and in their “essential 
security interest.” As neither of these terms have been interpreted by any GATT or WTO 
cases in the context of Article XXI, this argument is fraught with ambiguity which makes 
the success of invoking this exception uncertain.107  
¶58 The interpretation of the term “necessary,” given in the EC-Asbestos and Offshore 
Gambling cases as discussed above, may also limit measures to only those measures 
“reasonably available.” If so, regardless of the leeway given to the interpretation of the 
phrase “emergency in international relations,” if alternative WTO-compliant measures 
were available, the US would have to prove that despite those alternatives, the BFDA was 
necessary. This would be difficult to do. 
¶59 Nonetheless, some authors have suggested that Article XXI is a non-justiciable 
provision. 108 Other authors have pointed out this view is untenable because GATT rules 
are not designed to be self-judging and unilateral action is specifically excluded in the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).109 Some other authors have argued that 
Article XXI(b)(iii) should be interpreted to allow countermeasures in the form of trade 
sanctions that are proportioned to an illegal act committed by the target state and are 
designed to secure compliance with international legal norms.110  
¶60 The right to countermeasures by non- injured states or third party states is 
controversial though the famous dictum of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 
Barcelona Traction case111 did suggest that there are norms that all states have an interest 
and obligation to protect regardless of whether they suffered direct injury as obligations 
erga omnes. Indeed, some scholars have argued that some fundamental human rights 
have gained the status of jus cogens.112 However, the ambit of these jus cogens norms 
remain debatable. While some scholars have singled out the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)113 as having customary international law status due to its almost 
total and universal acceptance by states evidencing opinio juris,114 it is not entirely clear 
whether even some of the norms of the UDHR are jus cogens. 
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107 Craig Forcese, Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration, 5 
Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L. J. 47, 47-8 (2002). 
108 Richard Sutherland Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT Dispute Settlement 
Panel and the Article XXI Defense in the Context of the US Embargo of Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS 604, 616 (1987). 
109 Michael J Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT’s Security Exception, 12 
MICH. J. INT’L. L. 558, 558-567 (1991). 
110 See Whitt, supra  note 108, at 613. 
111 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, Second Phase (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 
3, at 32 (Feb. 5). 
112 See, e.g., THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 29-38 (1995); MICHAEL J. 
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 581 (3d ed. 2005). 
113 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,G.A. Res 217A at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. 1st  plen. Mtg., 
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¶61 Even so, the right to countermeasures to redress an egregious breach of a jus 
cogens and fundamental human right is not an unfettered one - it is circumscribed by the 
restraint of proportionality and must be designed to secure compliance.115 Martin 
Koskenniemi argues that the failure of states to explain their measures by defining which 
norms as erga omnes obligations need to be protected and how those norms are protected 
by the measure or sanction taken creates a danger of abuse of discretion by states.116 
While cases in the past, dealing with direct damage to the state instituting the 
countermeasure, seem to examine proportionality by examining the quantitative 
relationship between the breach and the response,117 Enzo Cannizzaro suggests that in a 
plurality of instruments and tools of self- redress available to states, emphasis must be 
given to the function each measure taken fulfils.118 While this argument is based on 
customary international law and not WTO obligations, it should be noted that this is 
similar in principle to the interpretation given to the phrase “necessary” in the EC-
Asbestos and Offshore Gambling cases. 
¶62 This must be especially so for cases where no clear direct damage has been suffered 
and instead the measure is taken to promote compliance with a norm. The 
appropriateness of the measure must be compared not to the quantity of damage suffered 
but instead with the results the measures are intended to achieve. If the measure does not 
or is unlikely to achieve the results it is intended to achieve it should be seen as a measure 
lacking in proportionality. In cases where the measure also causes collateral damage 
without achieving results, the proportionality of the measure must be called even more 
into question. This would seem to be the case for the BFDA with its sweeping measures, 
vague and broad objectives and the apparently severe economic harm caused to the 
civilian population of Myanmar. 
It could also be argued that a state quite apart from Article XXI(b)(iii) has a right 
to countermeasures based on customary international law and that if such 
countermeasures are indeed based on customary international law, then they exist in 
addition to the WTO exceptions. Therefore, an argument could then be made that when 
such customary international law based countermeasures are taken by a non- injured state 
to protect a jus cogens or preemptory norm, that because a treaty in conflict with the 
preemptory norm is void,119 the WTO disciplines cannot constrain the right to such a 
countermeasure.  
¶63 It is not within the scope of this paper to elaborate at length on this interesting 
conundrum but it suffices to say that countermeasures even in customary international 
law are also subject to the restriction of proportionality. 120 If so, then the same arguments 
regarding the use of countermeasures under Article XXI(b)(iii) would also apply to 
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countermeasures taken in customary international law. If a range of different alternatives 
are available as responses to a breach of a preemptory norm, then the alternatives must be 
weighed for their proportionality. As the BFDA lacks proportionality because its host of 
broad measures are not specifically directed at the wrongs the BFDA seeks to redress, 
even in customary international law, the BFDA cannot be justified as a countermeasure. 
¶64 Unlike the vagueness of Article XXI(b)(iii), the exception of Article XXI(c) is 
significantly clearer - a resolution of the UN Security Council resolution is needed. The 
UN Security Council has, for example, imposed economic sanctions that specifically 
targeted gross violations of human rights against Haiti, Rwanda and Congo.121 These 
sanctions would normally violate the GATT, were it not for the exception of Article 
XXI(c) GATT. 
¶65 The UN Security Council has not passed similar resolutions with regard to 
Myanmar yet. Thus, members will not be able to invoke this exception to justify trade 
sanctions against Myanmar. It should, however, be noted that on December 16, 2005, UN 
Under Secretary General Gambari with Secretary General Annan participating, briefed 
the Security Council for the first time on Myanmar.122 While the US will continue to 
press hard for further UN Security Council discussion and for such a resolution against 
Myanmar,123 the US must face China, a permanent member on the Security Council. 
Since China sees Myanmar as a vital strategic ally, China is likely to veto any such 
resolution. 
¶66 With respect to the more measured EU sanctions which freeze financial assets of 
the SPDC and limit the supply of arms to Myanmar, this author contends that the freezing 
of assets is not a per se breach of WTO obligations and even if it were, it could be seen as 
a proportional countermeasure under Article XX(b)(iii) as it is specifically targeted at 
punishing the SPDC in the hope that that punishment will incentivize them to improve 
their human rights record. The arms embargo to Myanmar can also be justified under 
Article XXI(b)(ii) which allows a state to impose trade limitations when it relates to “the 
traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military 
establishment.” 
¶67 The low priority given by the US to its GATT obligations in the two Nicaragua 
cases and the continuing low priority given by the US to its WTO obligations in relation 
to the way the US shaped its Myanmar policy and the BFDA is regrettable. It is probably 
true that the risk of the BFDA being challenged is small and that even if Myanmar were 
to successfully challenge the BFDA, that any ruling will most likely result in non-
compliance by the US leaving Myanmar with only retaliation as an impractical recourse 
due to the small amount of US exports to Myanmar. It is interesting to note, however, 
that US exports to Burma rose from US$6.9 million to US$11.6 million from 2003 to 
2004 whereas because of the BFDA, official Myanmar exports to the US fell in the same 
period from US$275.7 million to zero.124 Nonetheless, the value of a ruling is not to be 
measured in purely financial terms alone. Ideally, compensation and retaliation are 
                                                 
121 See UN Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=901 (last visited April 26, 2007). 
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supposed to be temporary measures and any ruling carries some moral weight as to the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the measure. It is also worth remembering that other WTO 
members may also potentially challenge the BFDA for nullification as the EU did the 
Massachusetts Burma Law. 
¶68 Additionally, with the difficulties of the Doha Round, the WTO system may be 
unable to deal with an additional new controversy involving unilateral trade sanctions to 
protect human rights. As submitted above, it is likely that the BFDA will not be 
compliant with WTO obligations and if brought to task over the BFDA, regardless of 
whether the US chooses to comply with the ruling, the US will essentially be faced with 
the problem of either backtracking on the BFDA or, as in the Nicaragua cases, declaring 
that trade sanctions to promote human rights are non-justiciable. The former would result 
in a loss of standing by the US government domestically and the latter could create 
potential loopholes that may be exploited by those with protectionist agendas.  
V. THE SOCIAL CLAUSE 
¶69 Nonetheless, the fact that the BFDA appears to be non-compliant with the WTO 
obligations of the US does not answer the question as to whether it would be desirable to 
have a specific trade and human or labor rights link - a Social Clause - so that sanctions 
and other trade measures targeted against the violations of such rights are in compliance 
with WTO obligations. Rules could then be negotiated and established which could also 
thereby constrain such an exception. Unfortunately, the regulatory regimes governing 
trade and human or labor rights have historically developed and co-existed in “splendid 
isolation”, as self-contained regimes without being attuned to one another.125  
¶70 Within the WTO there is strong resistance to any formal linkage between trade and 
labor rights. The developing nations are fearful that such a Social Clause could provide a 
legitimate mask for protectionist agendas. This fear was succinctly encapsulated in 1994 
by the then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, who shared his suspicions 
that: 
Western governments openly propose to eliminate the competitive edge of 
East Asia. The recent proposal for a world-wide minimum wage is a 
blatant example.  Westerners know that this is the sole comparative 
advantage of developing countries. All other comparative advantages 
(technology, capital, rich domestic markets, legal frameworks, 
management and marketing networks) are with the developed states. It is 
obvious that the professed concern about workers’ welfare is motivated by 
selfish interest. Sanctimonious pronouncements on humanitarian, 
democratic and environmental issues are likely to be motivated by a 
similar selfish desire to put as many obstacles as possible in the way of 
anyone attempting to catch up and compete with the West.126 
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¶71 Such sentiments resulted in the push by the developing nations for the declaration 
that emerged from the 1996 WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference.127 In this 
declaration, the following statement was made, “We renew our commitment to the 
observance of internationally recognized core labor standards. The ILO is the competent 
body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm the support for its work in 
promoting them.”128  
¶72 The 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration reaffirms this statement.129 And so the 
matter now stands – there is no explicit link, no Social Clause. However, despite these 
declarations, the issue of a trade and labor linkage however seems unlikely to go away, 130 
because the opinions about whether there should be a linkage remain divided. In the 
absence of any consensus on an express Social Clause, future WTO cases may 
conceivably expand GATT Articles XX and XXI, as discussed above, to create a de facto 
implied Social Clause circumscribed by the requirement of necessity and the chapeau in 
the former and proportionality in that latter.  
VI. ETHICS AND TRADE 
¶73 Proponents of an express Social Clause within the WTO argue that a state should 
be allowed to prohibit the import of products produced with forced labor or to interrupt 
economic relations with countries that commit severe human rights violations, in order to 
avoid supporting the repressing regime.131 Dismissing the 1996 Singapore Ministerial 
Declaration, they point out that the ILO has had indifferent success in eliminating labor 
rights violations.132 Indeed, compliance with ILO norms depends on a combination of 
public identification, embarrassment and shaming (a mild stick) and technical assistance 
to promote compliance (a mild carrot); thus it is not as effective in fostering compliance 
as the WTO with its ability to authorize trade sanctions.133 This argument does not rely on 
the old argument that trade causes exploitive labor practices, but merely views the trade 
system as a convenient tool to enforce labor rights.134  
¶74 It is clear that certain core labor standards can be characterized as human rights. 
These rights are stated in the UDHR, the subsequent International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights135 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.136 The 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work137 
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identifies four universally accepted workplace human rights as core labor rights, namely; 
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; (c) the 
effective abolition of child labor; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation. All members of the ILO, including Myanmar,138 have the 
obligation stemming from mere membership in the ILO to respect, promote and realize 
these principles.139  
¶75 Since this 1998 ILO Declaration was adopted unanimously, the old objection often 
expressed by developing countries that they are not obliged to respect these rights 
because they only reflect the cultural values of the developed countries cannot be made. 
“As all nations have a stake in the observation of universal human rights and by 
extension core labor standards, merely doing nothing in the face of violations of those 
rights is by definition, inconsistent with those rights.”140  
¶76 There is, however, a problem with defining the scope of these core labor standards. 
Should child labor be defined only in a term of a minimum age, or should one also take 
into account the working conditions? What constitutes forced labor? The open ended 
content of even these core labor rights makes it difficult to define what actual violations 
should be dealt with by the WTO (if indeed it should deal with them at all). Further, if 
one argues that there should be a link because doing nothing is inconsistent with those 
rights, one would expect that the effect of measures taken to have a positive influence on 
the human rights situation in the targeted country. However, experience has shown that 
trade related labor rights measures aimed at promoting labor rights often do not have their 
intended effect.141  
¶77 The Harkin Bill is one notable example . In 1993, US Senator Tom Harkin 
introduced a bill, the Child Labor Deterrence Act, which if enacted, would have 
prohibited the import into the US of minerals obtained or manufactured goods produced 
by child labor.142 The mere threat of trade sanctions implied in this bill induced 
employers in the Bangladesh garment industry to lay off tens of thousands of children, 
mostly girls.143 An ILO survey based on a sample of children laid off found that these had 
turned to other, in many cases more hazardous activities such as prostitution, and that 
none of them had returned to school. 144 The recognition of the consequences of such 
sanctions led to a rethinking of the strategy to involve the provision of alternatives which 
in the case of child labor in Bangladesh involved stipend payment and education schemes 
for expelled child garment workers.145 
¶78 In the case of Myanmar, the US sanctions have also largely missed their target. The 
military government does not own or control the garment export industry, which accounts 
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for about 85 percent of the US imports from Myanmar.146 The industry is dominated by 
local, generally small, privately owned companies which are estimated to form 88 percent 
of the industry. 147 These small privately owned companies employ 72 percent of the 
workers and produce 62 percent of the exports.148 The rest of the industry is divided 
between joint ventures (between SPDC-linked companies and foreign investors) as well 
as fully foreign-owned companies. Even so, military’s income from garment exports to 
the US in 2002, including taxes and revenue sharing from joint ventures was estimated at 
less than US$10 million.149 Even without factoring in the regime’s alleged involvement in 
the drug trade, this is insignificant when compared to their more lucrative businesses in 
natural gas, wood exports and gems.150  
¶79 While the losses from the BFDA for the military government are, thus, limited, the 
BFDA has caused the civilian population severe hardship. Preliminary reports on the 
effects of the BFDA indicate that the sanctions have already resulted in an estimated 
40,000 layoffs in the garment industry and some reports predict that 100,000 Burmese, 
mainly women working in the garment industry, stand to lose their job as a result of the 
sanctions.151 Some women who have already lost their jobs have been forced into 
prostitution out of economic necessity and the need to support their families.152 With the 
lack of an anti-HIV/AIDS health strategy in Myanmar, many of these women will 
eventually contract and die of HIV/AIDS.153  
¶80 As former US President Jimmy Carter observed, ”We must also strive to correct the 
injustice of economic sanctions that seek to penalize abusive leaders but all too often 
inflict punishment on those who are already suffering from the abuse.”154 
VII. THE SOUTH AFRICAN FALLACY 
¶81 However, proponents of sanctions often cite the example of South Africa and the 
end of apartheid to demons trate the effectiveness of sanctions in improving situations of 
human rights abuses. US Senator Mitch McConnell, for example, has stated that: 
“Sanctions worked in South Africa and they will in Burma too.”155 Such a view is overly 
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simplistic and fails to adequately compare the situation in South Africa at the end of the 
apartheid regime and that of present day Myanmar. 
¶82 Admittedly, there are similarities between the situation in apartheid South Africa 
and the present situation in Myanmar. In both, the stated aim of the US sanctions was to 
improve the situation of the people and end human rights abuses by targeting a small but 
powerful minority in order to force that group to relinquish control to the majority. In 
both situations, the US sought to balance the concerns of successfully effecting change, 
whilst avoiding harm to those that the sanctions intended to assist.156 In both situations, it 
could be argued that the US interest was to balance the concerns of successfully effecting 
change, while avoiding harm to those that the sanctions were intended to assist. 
¶83 Despite these similarities the analogy between the military government in 
Myanmar and the apartheid South African government is misleading because of four vital 
differences.157 The first difference is the absence of civil society and democratic 
institutions in Myanmar. While South Africa under apartheid was not a democracy, there 
was a democratic framework and in 1992 the white voters were able to bring the 
apartheid system to an end, when 68 percent voted in favor of the creation of a 
multiracial democracy in a referendum.158 While there was a unicameral people’s 
assembly under a one party rule from 1974 to 1988 in Myanmar, in reality, there has been 
no fully functioning parliament since the 1962 military takeover and no prospect of one 
in the foreseeable future.159 It is also unlikely that any significant percentage of the 
military government will vote for such a regime change. 
¶84 Strong internal pressure for political change in South Africa helped to end 
apartheid including an underground resistance movement aligned with the African 
National Congress, an open and broad-based opposition movement led by high profile 
figures such as Bishop Desmond Tutu, and union leader Cyril Ramaphosa, as well as a 
substantial group of white liberals and businessman. 160 In Myanmar, despite the fact that 
most people resent the military government, there is little active opposition due to brutal 
repression and perhaps the stoic influence of Buddhism. 161 
¶85 A second difference is that when apartheid became a major international concern, 
South Africa was already heavily integrated in the international community and foreign 
investment and trade was crucial for the government.162 The government came under 
strong pressure from domestic business which acted as a mediator for international 
sanctions and greatly added to their impact.163 These conditions are absent in Myanmar 
and most large companies in Myanmar with links to the global economy are either 
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controlled by the military or owe their position to military patronage.164 A liberal middle 
class of merchants does not exist in Myanmar as a counter influence to the hard line 
military government. 
¶86 Third, the white leaders of South Africa proved pragmatic - they chose to accept 
majority rule instead of living in a society of ever increasing repression and fear.165 The 
military in Myanmar appear to feel that they have achieved their primary objectives of 
maintaining national sovereignty and unity. They are less responsive to international 
pressure and isolate themselves from the international community. The move of the 
capital to the remote town of Pyinmana  illustrates their isolationist inclinations.166 
Sanctions may therefore even be helping sustain military rule by isolating Myanmar 
further. 
¶87 Finally, the sanctions imposed on South Africa were substantially supported by all 
its neighbours, as well as its main Western trading partners.167 By contrast there is no 
universal condemnation of Myanmar’s military government and the international 
community’s response towards Myanmar is far from uniform, having varied from 
different sanctions to engagement. The military government has been able to compensate 
for the impact of the sanctions on the economy by focusing on its cross-border trade with 
India and China.168 China now has over US$400 million of annual trade with Myanmar 
and this is likely to triple by 2008, while India is a growing potential market which aims 
to contain China’s influence in Myanmar by fostering closer bilateral ties.169 
¶88 It is highly questionable whether the BFDA will be an effective policy tool at all 
because of these differences. It is also unlikely that the EU sanctions will also effect 
much change except to prevent the military government from locating their financial 
assets in the EU.  
VIII. ENGAGEMENT 
¶89 When Myanmar's regime overturned the results of democratic elections won by 
Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD party in May 1990, ASEAN came under criticism from 
the US and the EU for its commercial links with Myanmar.170 ASEAN responded by 
adopting a policy of “constructive engagement” at its annual ministerial meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur the following year.171 This policy was designed to secure Myanmar's 
membership in ASEAN by the year 2000, to ward off US and EU pressures, and to justify 
the continuation of commercial relations. ASEAN's policy of constructive engagement 
was also prompted by the fear that an isolated Myanmar would move closer towards 
China.172  
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¶90 While political realism was more the motivating factor for ASEAN, there were 
some in ASEAN who truly believed that engagement rather than sanctions would move 
the Myanmar government towards a more liberal position. 173 Often, “transitions from 
autocratic rule in countries with established markets and private property are usually seen to 
stem from endogenous forces in which the ascendant middle class or bourgeoisie plays an 
important contributory role.”174 As Barrington Moore in his work on the origins of 
dictatorship and democracy tersely put it, “No bourgeois, no democracy.”175 Indeed, 
exogenous factors in transitions to democracy and markets are deemed by many writers to 
have played a minor role.  Though not denying external influences any role in regime 
change, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter regard as “fruitless” the search for 
“some international factor or context [which causes] regimes to collapse.”176  
¶91 Unfortunately, engagement, constructive or otherwise, has not worked in Myanmar 
either. Opponents of trade sanctions aimed at promoting human rights argue that trade 
sanctions hinder economic development that leads to higher income, which in turn 
produces a positive effect on the standard of living and enjoyment of human rights.177 
However, this chain of events assumes that workers will be able capture a significant 
share of their increased productivity through the natural operation of the labor market. In 
Myanmar this does not happen. In spite of trade with the ASEAN countries, India and 
China, the civilian population of Myanmar has remained poor and apart from a few more 
privately owned sectors like the textile industry, it is the military government that really 
gains significant profits from external trade.178  
¶92 Indeed, if a regime wants to stay in power and is threatened by the emergence of a 
liberal middle class, apparent economic openness, absent any institutional change, will 
have no effect, because the regime will simply seek to control trade, free enterprise and 
that developing middle class. This has been the case with Myanmar. It may be that 
measured engagement in certain more privately owned sectors such as the textile industry 
may allow some trickle down to the civilian population. However, such targeted 
engagement may result in the military government expanding its control to include those 
sectors. Therefore, such engagement would have to be dynamic and tied to certain codes 
(such as the Sullivan Principles179) which could act as disincentives for the military 
government to do so. 
¶93 Finally, proponents of engagement also point to the success of engagement with 
China arguing that trade has brought China further into the international order, thereby 
making it a more responsible actor.180 They expect trade to empower more internationalist 
and cooperative elements within Beijing.181 However, engagement has not significantly 
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modified China’s behavior towards Tibet or in its treatment of human rights activists both 
of which were key demands made by proponents of sanctions against China.182 Yet, some 
comfort can be drawn by observers of the rise of a large middle class in China due to the 
willingness of the Chinese government to allow free enterprise and freer trade. It still 
remains to be seen if Moore’s dictum will prove true for China. Regardless, for the 
reasons discussed above, the social and political situation in China is very different from 
that in Myanmar and it is unlikely that la issez faire engagement alone will result in a 
regime change in Myanmar. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
¶94 Pope John Paul II, in his address to the Vatican Diplomatic Corp in 1995 summed 
up his views of sanctions as follows: 
‘In today's interdependent world, a whole network of exchanges is forcing 
nations to live together, whether they like it or not. But there is a need to 
pass from simply living together to partnership. Isolation is no longer 
appropriate. The embargo in particular, clearly defined by law, is an 
instrument which needs to be used with great discernment, and it must be 
subjected to strict legal and ethical criteria. It is a means of exerting 
pressure on governments which have violated the international code of 
good conduct and of causing them to reconsider their cho ices. But in a 
sense it is also an act of force and, as certain cases of the present moment 
demonstrate, it inflicts grave hardships upon the people of the countries at 
which it is aimed. I often receive appeals for help from individuals 
suffering from confinement and extreme poverty. Here I would like to 
remind you who are diplomats that, before imposing such measures, it is 
always imperative to foresee the humanitarian consequences of sanctions, 
without failing to respect the just proportion that such measures should 
have in relation to the very evil which they are meant to remedy.’183 
¶95 So, if trade sanctions are not working to promote human rights and engagement has 
been a failure as well in Myanmar, can nothing be done about the Myanmar problem? 
The issue is not whether something can be done but rather what each actor wants to do 
about the Myanmar problem.  
¶96 Exogenous factors are less likely to influence a change from autocracy to 
democracy. Trade sanctions have not been successful in causing regime change absent 
the appropriate endogenous situation. Despite this, the US, in particular, continues to use 
heavy handed trade sanctions ostensibly to cause regime change. This suggests either 
simplistic thinking among the policy makers or a pandering to ill informed voices for 
domestic political gain. These sweeping sanctions are also more likely to be non-
compliant with the WTO obligations of the US. 
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¶97 On the other hand, the engagement approach is naïve if it believes that trade alone 
will create a liberal middle class which could then result in regime change. Reckless 
engagement has too often been an excuse for business as usual. Such a cavalier approach 
may also be inconsistent with the need to protect human rights.  
¶98 An alternative to the binary problem of sanctions or engagement has been offered 
in the form of ‘smart’ sanctions 184 - measured responses specifically tailored to maximize 
the target’s regime cost of non-compliance while minimizing the suffering of the target’s 
population. 185 However, even proponents admit that smart sanctions can still cause harm 
to the target’s population such as when an arms embargo increases the cost of arms 
procurement resulting in a diversion of funds from public goods.186 Further, as some 
scholars point out, sanctions with specifically tailored demands may have worked to 
change the behavior of friendly states but they have not been successful in bringing about 
regime change in authoritarian regimes due to differing conflict expectations.187  
¶99 Nevertheless, recalling that pre-existing WTO obligations should circumscribe 
trade sanctions, that the Myanmar regime should be publicly denounced and that some 
behavioral cost should be imposed on the regime but also bearing in mind the need to 
minimize harm to the civilian population, the EU sanctions are probably ‘smarter’ 
sanctions than the BFDA. That an arms embargo may have unforeseen circumstances 
does not change the fact that targeted sanctions cause less harm than one that bans all 
imports from Myanmar and this is less likely to be unjustifiably discriminatory or 
disproportional. 
¶100 Regardless, since no strategy can completely anticipate all the results of a particular 
measure, what is important is that international actors should swiftly reverse their course 
if a strategy is not working, is causing unintended harm and if that strategy looks unlikely 
to work even in the long run. The EU, for example, retracted the flight ban it imposed on 
Yugoslavia when it realized that the ban incurred more costs for the Yugoslav opposition 
than it did for the Milosevic regime.188 The US should similarly reconsider the BFDA. A 
possible option would be to use the ‘national security interest’ waiver authority found in 
Section (3)(b) of the BFDA to modify the sanctions on all products and to target specific 
products more directly linked to the SPDC or to follow the EU lead and target only the 
offshore funds and movement of SPDC members. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
said, “[I]t is not enough merely to make sanctions “smarter”. The challenge is to achieve 
consensus about the precise and specific aims of the sanctions, adjust the instruments 
accordingly and then provide the necessary means.”189 
¶101 The way forward is to navigate the path between the hypocrisy of ineffective and 
sweeping trade sanctions aimed at regime change but which instead merely impoverishes 
the civilian population and the naivety of laissez fair engagement which only enriches an 
autocratic regime. Perhaps dynamic smart sanctions and smart engagements can be 
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calibrated for each situation taking into account the particular conditions of each 
situation. 190 Regardless, the main concern of international actors seeking to address 
international ills should be, in the famous dictum of Hippocrates, to ‘[first] do no harm’191 
and if harm is caused then to swiftly redress that mistake.192 
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